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PAY NOW, EXECUTE LATER: WHY COUNTIES
SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO POST A BOND TO SEEK
THE DEATH PENALTY
Adam M. Gershowitz *
Since reinstating the death penalty in 1976,1 the Supreme
Court of the United States has added layer upon layer of proce-
dural regulations to capital cases in the hopes of making the
death penalty less arbitrary.2 Yet, while capital punishment is
heavily regulated, it is practically undisputed that the regulation
has been a failure.3 Many scholars believe that death sentences
are meted out just as arbitrarily today as they were thirty-five
years ago when the Court imposed a nationwide suspension on
capital punishment.4
With more than thirty years of failed regulation under its belt,
it seems clear that the Supreme Court is not going to solve the
arbitrariness problem and that scholars and activists must look
elsewhere. An idea that is rarely considered is the possibility that
state legislatures would have an incentive to reform the death
* Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law; B.A., 1998, University of
Delaware; J.D., 2001, University of Virginia School of Law. I am grateful to Monica Ortale
for helpful research assistance.
1. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976).
2. Today, unlike typical criminal cases, death penalty trials are marked by "super
due process" protections that give the impression of careful oversight. See Margaret Jane
Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1983). Consider, for instance, RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH'S,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2006) (1100-page textbook), and
NINA RIVKIND & STEVEN F. SHATZ'S, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PENALTY (2d
ed. 2005) (900 pages). Both textbooks focus on death penalty decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
3. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355,
360 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court's death penalty law "creates an impression of
enormous regulatory effort but achieves negligible regulatory effects").
4. See, e.g., DAVID R. Dow, EXECUTED ON A TECHNICALITY: LETHAL INJUSTICE ON
AMERICA'S DEATH Row, at xxii-xxiii (2005).
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penalty process themselves.5 In this article, I argue that state leg-
islatures, acting completely out of self-interest, could create a
more fair and efficient death penalty system by requiring local
county prosecutors, who handle most capital cases, to post a cash
bond in order to seek the death penalty. In turn, legislatures
could force counties to forfeit that bond if the capital prosecution
is unsuccessful at trial or on appeal.
Allow me to take a step back to set the stage. Most death pen-
alty cases are prosecuted at the county level, and there are great
disparities between the counties. For example, while Texas is well
known as the most frequent user of the death penalty,6 capital
cases are not initiated by the Texas Attorney General's office but
instead by a handful of Texas's 254 counties.7 While a majority of
Texas counties have not sought a single death sentence during
the last three decades,' Harris County-which includes the City
of Houston-consistently has sought the death penalty more than
a dozen times per year.9 Similarly, a disproportionate number of
capital prosecutions in the State of Pennsylvania are instigated
by the Philadelphia County District Attorney; ° most Illinois
5. Professors Ron Wright and Doug Berman have long argued that scholars put too
much emphasis on court-based solutions, while plausible legislative solutions are right
under our noses. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Foreword: Addressing Capital Punishment
Through Statutory Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 10 (2002) (lamenting that too much focus is
placed on the Supreme Court and suggesting that we "turn to legislatures to find some
hope within an otherwise discouraging story about the reform of capital systems"); Ronald
F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory,
90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 223 (2004) (arguing that indigent defense funding is more likely to
improve if the reform comes from legislatures rather than the judiciary).
6. TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2005, at 1, 11
(2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp05.pdf (collecting state death
penalty statistics for 2005 and 2006).
7. See Mike Tolson, A Deadly Distinction: Part II; Between Life and Death: Border-
line Capital Cases Raise Questions of Justice, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 5, 2001, at Al.
8. See id. (explaining that between 1976 and 2000, 138 of Texas's 254 counties never
sought the death penalty and that another 53 counties sought death only once).
9. See Mike Tolson & Steve Brewer, Harris County Is a Pipeline to Death Row. A
Four-Part Series Examines Why, and Explores Whether Justice Is Served; A Deadly Dis-
tinction, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 4, 2001, at Al; see also Eric Berger, Olympics Bid Confronts
Death Penalty; Boosters of 2012 Games in Houston Dismiss Capital Punishment as Issue,
Hous. CHRON., May 28, 2000, at A37 ("Since the death penalty was re-instated in 1976,
Harris County has sent more prisoners to their deaths-64--than all states except Texas
and Virginia."). But cf. Lianne Hart, Texas Is Sending Fewer to Death Row, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2006, at All (discussing various reasons for decline in Texas's death penalty
prosecutions in 2006).
10. See Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1995, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 22.
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cases come from Chicago's Cook County;1 1 and so the story goes
throughout the country. 12
By seeking the death penalty often, a handful of counties send
a disproportionate number of defendants to death row. Moreover,
as Professor James Liebman and his colleagues have found, those
jurisdictions that use the death penalty more frequently tend to
make more mistakes, thus leading to more appellate reversals.13
Given that counties have wide latitude to seek the death pen-
alty (and sometimes use that latitude in marginal, or even inap-
propriate, cases), any solution to the arbitrariness problem must
create an incentive for counties to choose their death penalty
cases more carefully and more sparingly. State legislatures can
create that incentive by requiring local county prosecutors to post
a cash bond and transmit the money to the state treasury before
filing capital charges.' 4
If the county prosecutors were successful in procuring a death
sentence and preserving that sentence on appeal, then the bond
would be returned to the county with interest. Thus, the county
would suffer no penalty" for seeking the death penalty in truly
heinous cases; those in which it was obvious that a jury would re-
turn a death sentence, and in which the prosecutors did not have
to push the envelope and risk an appellate reversal in order to
win a conviction. By contrast, if county prosecutors chose mar-
ginal cases in which juries refused to sentence the defendant to
death, or if prosecutors had to pull out all of the stops to procure
death sentences, leading to reversals on appeal, then the county
11. Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in Illi-
nois, 1988-1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39, 92 tbl.25 (2002) (studying the period between 1988 and
1997).
12. For a more detailed discussion, see Adam M. Gershowitz, Imposing a Cap on Capi-
tal Punishment, 72 MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3-5, available at
http:llssrn.com/abstract=905332).
13. JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH
ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT, 349-50 (2002), available at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/ ("[Tihe more death verdicts per homicides
a county imposes, the higher its capital-error rates are likely to rise.... Jurisdictions that
reserve the death penalty for only the very worst offenses do the best job of avoiding seri-
ous, capital error and the risks and costs that go with it.").
14. The bond could reflect the significant amount of money the state-as opposed to
the county government-normally shoulders in handling appeals of death sentences. See
infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
15. Of course, the county would lose the ability to immediately use the bond money
while the case is pending on appeal.
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would forfeit the bond to the state. Facing the obligation to post a
large sum of money ex ante, and the possibility of never having
that money returned, county prosecutors would have an incentive
to seek the death penalty in only the worst of the worst cases, and
an incentive to try those cases in a manner that gives every bene-
fit of the doubt to the defendant so that the death sentence will
stand up on appeal.16
Requiring counties to post a bond would be a simple, yet stark,
change from the current death penalty framework in most states.
Currently, in most jurisdictions, counties initially fund the hefty
costs of capital prosecutions, but they pass responsibility (and the
bill) to state governments to handle most or even all of the very
costly appellate and habeas corpus petitions17 that capital peti-
tioners file for years after trial."8 Thus, under the current system,
when counties choose their capital cases poorly, they are not
forced to internalize the substantial post-trial costs associated
with their errors.19 Instead, the states are forced to foot a large
part of the bill.
16. Many counties currently spend large sums of money on capital prosecutions and
appear not to be concerned about the reversals. See Robert M. Bohm, The Economic Costs
of Capital Punishment: Past, Present, and Future, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 573, 576-82 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003) (discussing
added pre-trial and trial expenses associated with capital cases); Russell Gold, Counties
Struggle With High Cost of Prosecuting Death-Penalty Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2002, at
B1 (recounting a 6.7% property tax increase to pay for death penalty trials arising out of
the murder of James Byrd). Counties' behavior might change, however, if they were re-
quired to pay specified costs ex ante.
17. See Bohm, supra note 16, at 582 ("The post-trial stage generally is the most ex-
pensive part of the entire process.") (citing RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN AMERICA 212 (1991)).
18. See, e.g., OFFICE OF VICTIM ASSISTANCE, OFFICE OF THE ATrTY GEN. OF ALA., A
GUIDEBOOK TO ALABAMA'S DEATH PENALTY APPEALS PROCESS 6-7, available at http:l
www.ago.state.al.us/documents/deathpenalty.pdf; OFFICE OF THE VICTIMS' SERVS., OFFICE
OF THE ATr'Y GEN. OF CAL., A VICTIM'S GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL CASE PROCESS 2 (2000),
available at http:/ag.ca.gov/victimservices/pdf/deathpen.pdf; POST CONVICTION LITIG. DIV.,
OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN. OF TEX., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT APPELLATE GUIDEBOOK 2 (2006),
available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/AGPublications/pdfs/appellate2006.pdf ("In fed-
eral court, the Attorney General represents both the State's and victim's interest.");
VICTIM NOTIFICATION PROGRAM, OFFICE OF THE ATT'y GEN. OF VA., THE APPELLATE
PROCESS FOR A VIRGINIA CAPITAL MURDER CONVICTION 1, available at http://oag.state.
va.us/KEYISSUES/VICTIMNOTIFICATION/capmurder.pdf.
19. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030,
2127 (2000) ("[Tihe penalty for error by trial-level prosecutors and judges never requires
them to bear the huge financial costs of the lengthy post-conviction process that the error
imposed on state-level states' attorneys and judges.").
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The virtue of the bond proposal is that it leaves discretion in
the hands of local prosecutors to determine which capital cases
they want to pursue while forcing them to take full responsibility
for those decisions. By requiring counties to post (and risk forfeit-
ing) a bond commensurate with the states' costs, state legisla-
tures would be telling the counties to:
Go ahead and seek the death penalty as often as you like. If you are
successful the state will cover the expensive appellate and postcon-
viction costs. But if you are unsuccessful, then you will forfeit a cash
bond to compensate the state for the expenses it paid with respect to
your failed capital prosecutions.
Obviously, counties that make frequent use of the death pen-
alty would lobby against any such proposal. Yet, the proposal
should be appealing to state legislators on at least two levels.
First, many legislators care about the racial, economic, and geo-
graphic arbitrariness of the death penalty and would welcome
legislation that has a chance of curbing those unfortunate reali-
ties.2 ° Second, and perhaps more significant in times of tight
budgets, legislators frequently seek ways to find money that could
be used for other projects. If the legislature were to set the cash
bond for capital cases at $300,000, and if the bond were forfeited
in ten cases per year, then the state would have.an additional $3
million to spend on education, healthcare, or other projects. Thus,
legislatures would be saving money for their states by charging
counties for failed capital appeals, while at the same time re-
maining tough on crime by paying for the costs of successful capi-
tal appeals.
Part I of this article briefly reviews the Supreme Court's failed
efforts to eliminate the arbitrary use of the death penalty. Part I
also discusses how certain counties seek the death penalty dra-
matically more often than comparable jurisdictions and "overpro-
duce" death by procuring many death sentences that are reversed
on appeal and never result in executions.21 Because states typi-
20. Consider the tireless efforts of Texas State Senator Rodney Ellis, who has intro-
duced legislation to establish an innocence commission in Texas and to provide better rep-
resentation for indigent defendants. See Howard Witt, Texas Urged to Probe Claims of
Wrongful Executions, CHI. TRIB., July 7, 2006, at 6 (discussing how Sen. Ellis introduced
two bills to study past death penalty cases); Rodney Ellis & Hanna Liebman Dershowitz,
Gideon's Promise: The Texas Story, CHAMPION, Apr. 2003, at 61 (discussing the Fair De-
fense Act, a bill also sponsored by Sen. Ellis).
21. See Liebman, supra note 19, at 2056-57 ("What most condemned men and women
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cally handle the expensive appellate and postconviction petitions,
these counties never fully internalize the costs of their failed
death penalty prosecutions. Part II proposes that legislatures re-
quire counties to post a cash bond before seeking the death pen-
alty, and that the bond be forfeited if a county's efforts to procure
an execution fail. Part II additionally suggests two possible stat-
utes that legislatures could adopt to implement the proposal-one
that provides for total forfeiture of the bond in all failed prosecu-
tions, and one that graduates the forfeiture amount depending on
the stage in which the capital prosecution failed. Part III then
discusses the incentives legislatures would have to enact this
proposal. In particular, Part III discusses the high costs states
pay for capital appeals. Part III also explains that, despite the
need to be "tough on crime," legislatures have been reducing cor-
rections funding in recent years to ensure that other government
priorities are funded. Legislators who realize how much money
failed county death penalty prosecutions are costing state taxpay-
ers would have an incentive to put the onus on county prosecutors
to assume the financial risks associated with their capital prose-
cutions.
I. STILL ARBITRARY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS
A. The Court's Efforts to Regulate the Death Penalty
The modern era of death penalty jurisprudence began in 1976
when the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment. In Gregg
v. Georgia,22 the Supreme Court indicated that states could create
a constitutional death penalty framework by providing "for a bi-
furcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised
of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and pro-
vided with standards to guide its use of the information."23 In
that connection, the Court has required that defendants be per-
mitted to introduce any evidence that mitigates against a death
sentence, even if such evidence is not contemplated by the gov-
do after being sentenced to die is wait-for eleven years on average. And what most of
them, in reality, are waiting for is not execution, but reversal of their capital judgments
because of serious legal error.").
22. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
23. Id. at 195.
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erning statute.24 Conversely, the Court also has devoted consid-
erable attention to the aggravating circumstances that make de-
fendants eligible for the death penalty by requiring that the ag-
gravating circumstances be clearly defined, 25 by prohibiting the
consideration of aggravating factors that are not disclosed to the
defendant, 26 and by demanding that aggravating circumstances
be found by the jury rather than a judge.27
In addition to dealing with the types of evidence presented to
juries, the Court has heavily regulated the process of selecting
capital juries. In a series of decisions, the Court tinkered with the
standard for removing prospective jurors who are opposed to the
death penalty.2" It also set standards for removing jurors who
would never impose the death penalty, 29 and it considered chal-
lenges that juries composed of death penalty supporters were in-
herently biased toward conviction.3 °
The Court also has devoted considerable attention to the ade-
quacy of representation received by indigent defendants. In a long
series of cases, the Court has attempted to define how much in-
vestigation competent counsel are required to undertake to be ef-
fective during the sentencing phase of capital trials.31 It has also
24. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (plurality opinion).
25. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-64 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 427-33 (1980).
26. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) ("[The defendant] was denied due
process of law when the death sentence was imposed ... on the basis of information which
he had no opportunity to deny or explain.").
27. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
28. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 419 (1985) (noting that a juror need not
harbor "unmistakably clear" bias against the death penalty to be excluded); Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980) (finding it impermissible to exclude a juror "based on his
views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties"); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22 (1968) (hold-
ing that juror cannot be excluded "simply because they voiced general objections to the
death penalty").
29. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992) ("[A] juror who in no case would
vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror
and must be removed for cause.").
30. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178, 183-84 (1986) (rejecting the chal-
lenge); Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517-18 (refusing to adopt a "per se constitutional rule"
that would reverse convictions when potential jurors who opposed the death penalty were
excluded from the jury).
31. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383-86 (2005) (finding ineffective assistance
of counsel for failing to examine the court file from the defendant's prior conviction, which
contained mitigating material); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524-26 (2003) (finding
ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel conducted an inadequate investigation "re-
sult[ing] from inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment" that failed to discover power-
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
sought to carve out an area of presumptively valid representation
based on lawyers' strategic choices at trial.32
In the substantive realm, the Court has forbidden the execu-
tion of juveniles,33 the mentally retarded,34 certain rapists,35 and
certain felony murders.36 Yet, even these seemingly simple sub-
stantive restrictions on capital punishment have spawned com-
plicated new areas of death penalty jurisprudence. While it is
usually clear whether a defendant was under eighteen years of
age at the time of his crime, it is not always clear whether a de-
fendant was mentally retarded. And in that connection, the Su-
preme Court has opened the door to a maze of litigation about
who is in fact mentally retarded.37
Put simply, the Court has created a large body of procedural
regulations to govern the death penalty, providing capital peti-
tioners with numerous theories to appeal their sentences.38 Yet,
as explained below, the Court's efforts have been a failure.39
ful mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000) (finding ineffec-
tive counsel where counsel's failure to introduce "voluminous" mitigating evidence was
"not justified by a tactical decision"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96
(1984) (setting a two part test standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
32. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-95 (1987) (finding that counsel's trial
strategy was "supported by reasonable professional judgment"); Darden v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 168, 184-87 (1986) (relying on counsel's reasonable choices).
33. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) ("The Eight and Fourteenth
Amendments forbid the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the
age of 18 when their crimes were committed.").
34. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) ("[D]eath is not a suitable pun-
ishment for a mentally retarded criminal.").
35. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (forbidding the death penalty for
the rape of adult women stating "a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and ex-
cessive punishment for the crime of rape").
36. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-98 (1982) (concluding that the death
penalty is inappropriate for one who aids and abets a felony murder).
37. Compare Stephen B. Brauerman, Comment, Balancing the Burden: The Constitu-
tional Justification for Requiring the Government to Prove the Absence of Mental Retarda-
tion Before Imposing the Death Penalty, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 401, 403 (2004) (arguing that
"the Constitution requires the government to prove the absence of mental retardation" in
order for the death penalty to be imposed), with Bill Lockyer & Taylor S. Carey, Capital
Punishment and the Mentally Retarded: Implementing Atkins, 15 STAN. L. & POLy REV.
329, 340 (2004) (intimating that defendants should bear the burden of proof).
38. At the same time that the Court has created a variety of procedural rules that
capital petitioners can invoke, the Court has made it very difficult for petitioners to suc-
cessfully exercise those procedural guarantees and receive a ruling on the merits of their
cases. Indeed, even before Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No 109-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in
scattered sections and titles of U.S.C.), which drastically restricted the availability of ha-
beas corpus, see id. §§ 101-108, the Supreme Court had streamlined the availability of ha-
[Vol. 41:861
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B. Arbitrariness Continues
Three decades after the Supreme Court reinstated capital pun-
ishment and adopted a complicated series of procedures to regu-
late it, critics still find much to criticize about the American
death penalty system. Critics seize on the fact that in the thirty
years since Gregg, 123 individuals have been exonerated and
freed from death rows across the country.4 ° Many of these indi-
viduals were exonerated not as a result of judicial inquiries but
because journalism students or other activists brought their cases
to public light.41 Scholars explain that the dozens of death pen-
alty decisions laid down by the Court have done little or nothing
to protect the innocent from being convicted or to provide an ave-
nue for the wrongfully convicted to exonerate themselves on ap-
peal.42 To the contrary, the Court's fractured 1993 decision in
Herrera v. Collins43 forbade freestanding claims of actual inno-
cence from being brought in habeas corpus petitions and ap-
peared to authorize the execution of actually innocent defendants
who could not demonstrate a cognizable constitutional violation
beas corpus in both capital and non-capital cases. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle,
Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 5-6 (1997) (ex-
plaining that during the 1980s and 1990s the Supreme Court succeeded in narrowing the
availability of habeas corpus long before Congress passed AEDPA). The Court has made it
very difficult for petitioners who failed to raise issues in state court to have those issues
reviewed on the merits in federal court. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 90-91
(1977) (imposing a "cause-and-prejudice" test for procedural default in federal court). The
Court also has adopted a complicated (and largely insurmountable) test for applying new
rules of criminal procedure to individuals whose convictions are final. See Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 311-316 (1989) (holding that habeas petitioners cannot benefit from new
rules of criminal procedure except if the new rule prescribes the ability to criminalize con-
duct or if the new rule is a watershed rule of criminal procedure).
39. For a compelling criticism of the Court's efforts to reduce arbitrariness, see Scott
W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the Capital-Sentencing
Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795 (1998).
40. Henry Weinstein, North Carolina to Weigh Claims of Innocence, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
4, 2006 at 18; Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=412&scid=6 (last visited Apr. 10, 2007)
(compiling death penalty exoneration statistics).
41. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Class of Sleuths to Rescue on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 1999, at A16 (discussing research by Northwestern University journalism students that
led to the exoneration of deathrow inmate); Don Terry, DNA Tests and a Confession Set
Three on the Path to Freedom in 1978 Murders, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1996, at A6 (same).
42. See George C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality, Effi-
ciency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 263, 267 (2003) ("It appears that the
Supreme Court has neglected the most important 'do-no-harm' value of the criminal jus-
tice system: to separate the innocent from the guilty.").
43. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
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such as ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial miscon-
duct.44
While innocence has been a call to arms, Professor David Dow
has observed recently-and correctly-that innocence is primarily
a distraction from the more prevalent flaws that continue to per-
vade the death penalty system.45 Most notable is the continuing
problem of racial discrimination in capital punishment. Although
the days of white mobs lynching black citizens are long since
gone, 46 racial discrimination remains pervasive, and death rows
continue to be filled with a disproportionate number of minority
offenders.47 In numerous studies, Professor David Baldus and
other scholars have documented the continued widespread racial
discrimination in capital sentencing throughout the country.48
The Court's procedural regulation of the death penalty has done
little to reduce the racial discrimination problem over the last
thirty years. Indeed, when an equal protection challenge based on
Professor Baldus's data reached the Court in 1987, the Court spe-
cifically rejected it out-of-hand.49
Another systematic problem which predates the Gregg decision
and which still exists today is the inadequate representation af-
forded to indigent capital defendants. Although the Supreme
44. See id. at 400 ("Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence
have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent
constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding."). For criti-
cism of Herrera, see Susan Bandes, Simple Murder: A Comment on the Legality of Execut-
ing the Innocent, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 501 (1996).
45. See David R. Dow, Op-Ed, The End of Innocence, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at
A31 ("Innocence is a distraction... [Abolitionists] ought to focus on the far more pervasive
problem: that the machinery of death in America is lawless, and in carrying out death sen-
tences, we violate our legal principles nearly all of the time."); see also Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Fo-
cus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
587, 623 (2005).
46. See JAMES R. McGOVERN, ANATOMY OF A LYNCHING: THE KILLING OF CLAUDE
NEAL 1-15 (1982) (providing an historical overview of lynching in the United States).
47. See, e.g., John M. Baer, Faulkner, Mumia in Mix; State Senate Hearing Set on
Moratorium for Death Penalty, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 21, 2000, at 7 (stating that 111 of
the 126 death row inmates from Philadelphia are African-American or Hispanic).
48. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 401
(1990) (describing the results of a long-term study showing that a defendant's odds of be-
ing sentenced to death were 4.3 times higher if the victim was white); David C. Baldus, et
al., Racial Discrimination in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview,
with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1661 (1998) (explain-
ing that in 96% of the states where there have been reviews of race and the death penalty,
there was a pattern of either race-of-victim or race-of-defendant discrimination or both).
49. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987).
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Court has recently imposed slightly more rigorous review on inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims, ° few would dispute that poor
capital defendants are often represented by appointed lawyers
who are unqualified or overworked.51 Thus, the poor are far more
likely to be sentenced to death than those who can afford their
own counsel.52
Another troubling problem continues to be the geographic arbi-
trariness associated with the imposition of capital punishment. A
handful of states produce most of the nation's death sentences,
and an even smaller number of states are responsible for most of
the actual executions. Between 1973 and 2004, southern states
accounted for more than 60% of the nation's death sentences and
more than 82% of its executions.5 3 Among the southern states,
Texas and Virginia accounted for 43% of the nation's executions.54
By contrast, northeastern states accounted for only about six per-
cent of the country's death sentences and well under one percent
of its executions. 
5 5
The disparities, however, are not simply regional. As noted
above, there are Texas counties that never seek the death pen-
50. See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Litigation of Ineffective Assistance Claims: Some
Uncomfortable Reflections on Massaro v. United States, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 793, 804 (2004)
("A majority of the Court seems to have serious concerns about the ineffective assistance
problem. Two recent decisions have taken a surprisingly rigorous view of the Strickland
test.") (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000)).
51. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1857-66 (1994) (lamenting the abys-
mal representation provided to many capital defendants); see also Vivian Berger, The Chi-
ropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 245, 249 (1990) (stating that capital defendants frequently "are represented by
the incompetent or inexperienced"); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of
"Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 489-94 (1993) (discussing the
unavailability of lawyers qualified to represent capital defendants); Douglas W. Vick,
Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences,
43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 397-98 (1995) (stating that a lack of funding discourages qualified
counsel from taking appointments in death penalty cases).
52. See Bright, supra note 51, at 1883 (summarizing the argument that the death
penalty is often imposed "not upon those who commit the worst crimes, but upon those
who have the misfortune to be assigned the worst lawyers.").
53. See Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 24-25.
54. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR & TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, 2004, at 16 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp04.
pdf.
55. See Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 24-25. Even more startling, of the northern
states, Pennsylvania accounted for more than 83% of the region's death sentences and all
of its executions. See id. at 25.
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alty, even as Harris County, home to Houston, sentenced more
than 200 people to death between 1976 and 2000.56 In Pennsyl-
vania, Philadelphia County has sent well over 100 individuals to
death row, while comparably sized Pittsburgh has sent very
few.5 7 Similar disparities have been documented between Cincin-
nati and Columbus, Ohio; New York City and upstate New York;
Memphis and Nashville, Tennessee; and the Baltimore suburbs
and Baltimore City."s
By discussing arbitrariness problems associated with inno-
cence, race, class, and geography, I do not mean to suggest that
the judiciary is absent from the supervision of capital punish-
ment. To the contrary, the judiciary exercises vigorous oversight
to ensure compliance with the procedural protections laid down
by the Supreme Court over the last three decades. Professor
James Liebman and his colleagues have found that a staggering
sixty-eight percent of capital trials conducted between 1973 and
1995 were reversed on appeal.5 9 As Professor Liebman explained,
death sentences are "overproduced;" up to six death sentences are
handed down for each execution that is actually carried out.6"
Nevertheless, appellate review has not made a dent in the core
arbitrariness problems associated with the death penalty: the in-
nocent are still sentenced to death; being poor drastically in-
creases the odds of execution; racial discrimination still pervades
the system; and the likelihood of being sentenced to death often
depends on which side of the county line the defendant committed
his crime. Ultimately, the Court's strict supervision of capital
punishment has resulted in petitioners spending tremendous
56. See Tolson, supra note 7.
57. See Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 28-29; see also Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting
Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 344 n.21 (2006) (explaining that Philadelphia represents
thirteen percent of the state population but over half of the death row inmates); William
C. Smith, A Tale of Two Cities, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 15, 1997, at 1 ("[The] Phila-
delphia D.A.'s office is much more aggressive in seeking the death penalty.").
58. See Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 27-30 (discussing the disparities in greater de-
tail).
59. James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-
1995, at 4-5 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper
No. 15, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=232712 (concluding that courts found
reversible error in sixty-eight percent of death sentences that were fully reviewed on the
merits).
60. See Liebman, supra note 19, at 2048.
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time wrangling their way through procedural hurdles, while
courts spend very little time on the actual merits of the cases. 6 1
II. REQUIRING COUNTY PROSECUTORS TO POST A BOND
Given that the Court's efforts to reduce the arbitrariness of the
death penalty, through procedural regulations and a handful of
substantive restrictions, have proved to be a failure, it is time to
consider another approach. Because many academics tend to be
court-focused,62 they devote little attention to the prospect of leg-
islatures, rather than the judiciary, imposing restrictions that
could improve the functioning of the death penalty.63
There are a number of ways state legislatures could try to clean
up the death penalty mess. States could restrict the number64 or
types 65 of cases that are statutorily eligible for the death penalty,
impose a higher burden of proof in capital cases,66 or provide
greater avenues for post-trial review.67 Yet, while these proposals
may have some merit, no state legislatures have taken the bait.
Perhaps the explanation for the lack of interest is that the pro-
posals are not politically viable; each might be a political earth-
quake that would place unpopular obstacles in the way of execu-
61. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 3, at 429 (calling the Court's death penalty ju-
risprudence a "facade" that serves more to make "the public at large more comfortable
with the death penalty" than with providing actual protection to defendants).
62. I tend to be guilty of this as well. In a recent article, I suggested that the Court
could fix the arbitrariness problem if it would scrap its current jurisprudence and instead
cap death penalty prosecutions for each jurisdiction at the national average. See Gershow-
itz, supra note 12, at 7.
63. See Berman, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that "we now may be able to turn to legis-
latures to find some hope" for reform).
64. Cf. Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 7 (suggesting that the Supreme Court cap death
penalty prosecutions at the national average).
65. See LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 394-95 (raising the possibility of limiting
the death penalty to crimes of the magnitude of September 11th and the Oklahoma City
bombing).
66. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, A (Genuinely) Modest Proposal Concerning the Death
Penalty, 72 IND. L.J. 25, 27 (1996); Margery Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Executions
by Adopting the Model Penal Code's Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt,
21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 111-12 (2001); Hon. Leonard B. Sand & Danielle L. Rose, Proof
Beyond All Possible Doubt: Is There a Need for a Higher Burden of Proof When the Sen-
tence May Be Death?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1359, 1361 (2003); Elizabeth R. Jungman,
Note, Beyond All Doubt, 91 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1089-91 (2003).
67. See Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 285 ("An-
other potential solution is to create procedures that would treat postconviction claims of
innocence separately from other claims.").
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tions without creating any immediately noticeable benefits. In
place of these less palatable approaches, I offer a more modest
proposal: the requirement that prosecutors post a bond before
seeking the death penalty.
In most criminal cases, states delegate prosecutorial responsi-
bility to the counties. Thus, it is the county prosecutor who rises
in open court to say, "The State is ready to proceed, Your Honor."
I do not propose to change that arrangement in capital cases, but
simply to have the states impose a monetary restriction on the
counties. In recognition of the fact that states often have to shoul-
der high costs to defend the counties' death sentences on appeal,
and that many of those death sentences do not survive on appeal,
state legislatures should require county prosecutors to post a
bond to cover the states' appellate costs.
The rationale for requiring county prosecutors to post a bond is
comparable to the reason society requires criminal defendants to
post bond. Judges force defendants to post bond to encourage
them to show up for trial.68 In essence, defendants must post
bond because society does not trust them to act properly without
the prospect of losing money hanging over their heads. The same
logic easily could apply to county prosecutors. If prosecutors want
to seek the death penalty, society should not prevent them, but it
should create an incentive to guarantee they will behave properly
by bringing only meritorious cases and litigating them in a man-
ner that is extremely unlikely to result in reversal on appeal. Be-
low, I offer two types of bond statutes that state legislatures could
adopt.
A. The All-Or-Nothing Approach
The first proposal is what could be called the "all-or-nothing"
approach. In every capital case, county prosecutors could be re-
quired to post a bond by. sending a predetermined sum of money
to the state treasury. If the defendant is executed, the state would
promptly return the entire bond, plus interest, to the county. If
the jury refuses to hand down a death sentence, or if the death
sentence is reversed on appeal,69 then the county would forfeit
68. See Daniel Richman, United States v. Salerno: The Constitutionality of Regulatory
Detention, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 414 (Carol S. Steiker ed. 2006).
69. At first blush, observers might worry that appellate lawyers in the attorney gen-
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the entire bond, plus all accrued interest, to the state.7 ° While
called an "all-or-nothing" proposal, there would have to be two ex-
ceptions for situations beyond counties' control. First, a county
should be entitled to a refund of its bond, plus interest, in the
event that the governor or state pardon board grants an inmate
clemency71 for a reason other than prosecutorial misconduct.
7 2
Second, if the inmate dies prematurely in prison before his ap-
peals have run their course-a process which currently takes an
average of more than ten years73-the county should be entitled
to a refund of its bond, plus interest, based on the presumption
that the death sentence would have been carried out. 
7
eral's office would have an incentive to "throw" death penalty appeals because reversals
would result in more money being brought into state, rather than county, coffers. This
possibility is highly unlikely, however, because litigators, whether trial or appellate and
whether state or county employees, want to win, particularly in capital cases. Prevailing
on a capital appeal is personally satisfying to lawyers in the attorney general's office and
helps to enhance their reputations, thus giving them a chance to climb the ladder to a
higher position. See, e.g., Norman Lefstein, Reform of Defense Representation in Capital
Cases: The Indiana Experience and Its Implications for the Nation, 29 IND. L. REV. 495,
511 (1996) ("[A] prosecutor does not want to risk losing [capital cases] because that gener-
ates negative publicity and is seen as a 'knock on the prosecutor.'").
70. Observers also might contend that forcing small counties to post a large cash bond
ex ante would deter them from seeking the death penalty in meritorious cases. There is
some risk of this, but examples abound of small counties prosecuting egregious capital
cases in the face of huge costs. See Gold, supra note 16; see also infra Part II.C. If high
trial costs do not deter counties from seeking the death penalty in the occasional egregious
case, the requirement to post an additional cash bond likely would not deter them either.
Instead, the proposal is aimed at deterring jurisdictions that seek the death penalty in
numerous marginal cases where the cost of posting multiple cash bonds would be a greater
deterrent.
71. With the exception of Illinois, grants of clemency have been rare events in capital
cases in the last few decades. See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS
TO STOP AN EXECUTION 33 (2005) ("Today capital clemency is an endangered species.").
72. The classic case of prosecutorial misconduct would be the failure to turn over ex-
culpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Other examples
include using peremptory challenges based on race or gender, suborning perjury, coercing
witnesses, fabricating evidence, and making false statements to the jury. See JIM DWYER
ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE
WRONGLY CONVICTED 172-82 (2000) (discussing various instances of prosecutorial mis-
conduct).
73. See BONCZAR & SNELL, supra note 54, at 11 & tbl.11.
74. This presumption runs counter, at least in part, to the abatement doctrine,
whereby the record of a defendant who dies before his initial appeal has been resolved is
wiped clean. See Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971) (per curiam) ("[D]eath
pending direct review of a criminal conviction abates not only the appeal but also all pro-
ceedings had in the prosecution from its inception."). The death of former Enron Chairman
Ken Lay following his conviction has renewed discussion of the appropriateness of the
abatement doctrine. See Kristin Hays, Prosecutors Drop Lay Appeal; Government With-
draws Notice to Challenge Ruling Clearing Record, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 21, 2006, at Bus.
1.
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The all-or-nothing approach has the virtue of being a fairly
simple bright-line rule. Counties would have to decide at the out-
set whether they believe they will be successful at trial and on
appeal. If the prosecutors think there is some risk of an acquittal,
a life sentence, or an appellate reversal, then they would have to
weigh whether seeking the death penalty is worth the financial
risk of losing the bond.
An additional benefit of the all-or-nothing approach would be to
promote truth-in-charging. Today, prosecutors occasionally seek
the death penalty in the hopes of encouraging the defendant to
plead guilty to a charge carrying a lengthy prison sentence.7 5
Critics have long railed against this practice as too heavy-
handed, 6 and they have proposed policies encouraging prosecu-
tors to file charges only for those crimes for which they truly be-
lieve they can secure convictions.77 While plea bargaining is likely
to remain alive and well in run-of-the-mill criminal cases, impos-
ing a bond requirement in capital cases would greatly restrict the
most heavy-handed bargaining.
Relatedly, critics have also asserted that prosecutors who do
not actually desire a death sentence sometimes seek the death
penalty because a death-qualified jury7" is more likely to convict
75. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970) (upholding a guilty plea by a
defendant who claimed to be innocent and who only pled guilty to avoid the death pen-
alty); MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN
CAPITAL CASES 163 (1992) (quoting defendant who plead guilty to avoid the death penalty
as saying that prosecutors "told me if I pleaded guilty, I'd only get maybe a couple of years.
If I didn't, I'd go to the chair for sure."); EMILY WILSON, ET AL., TENNESSEE'S DEATH
PENALTY: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES, 13 (July 2004), available at http://www.comptroller.
state.tn.us/orea/reports/deathpenalty.pdf ("[S]urveys and interviews indicate that [other
prosecutors] use the death penalty as a 'bargaining chip' to secure plea bargains for lesser
sentences."); Liebman, supra note 19, at 2097 ("[Capital punishment] provides the best
plea-bargaining leverage imaginable."). For an empirical assessment, see Ilyana
Kuziemko, Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Affect Plea Bargaining in Murder Cases?
Evidence From New York's 1995 Reinstatement of Capital Punishment, 8 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 116, 140 (2006) ("The findings here suggest that the threat of the death penalty leads
more defendants to plead guilty to their original arraignment charges.").
76. See Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1998, at 125, 142-43 ("It seems that innocent defendants
will almost always risk additional years of their lives in order to seek vindication rather
than accept disgrace coupled with a long term of imprisonment, but some will not go so far
as to risk death.").
77. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 873-78 (1995)
(proposing to financially reward prosecutors for obtaining convictions on the same charge
pursued at the outset of the case).
78. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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the defendant of the underlying murder charge.79 If prosecutors
do currently use this tactic, the requirement of posting and possi-
bly forfeiting a bond likely would put an end to it.
In addition to encouraging prosecutors to choose their death
penalty cases more carefully and more sparingly, the bond re-
quirement would also encourage prosecutors to try cases with
greater caution and to give all close calls to the defendant, so as
to avoid a reversal on appeal. Under the current system, prosecu-
tors who procure death sentences are rewarded with good public-
ity, promotions, and perhaps even with judicial office.8 0 By con-
trast, those same prosecutors suffer little stigma when death
sentences are reversed on appeal because many years have gone
by (at which point the prosecutor may not even work in the office
any longer) and the public's attention has moved on to new death
penalty cases.8 ' Moreover, when capital cases are reversed, prose-
cutors often are able to lay the blame on the judiciary rather than
the prosecutor's office. Thus, prosecutors who push the envelope
at trial to procure a death sentence are rarely called on the carpet
to account for appellate reversals.8 2
Requiring counties to forfeit a cash bond following reversals
likely would stigmatize the prosecutors who handled the case at
trial. Following reversal of a death sentence, local newspapers
and television stations almost certainly would run stories indicat-
ing that the reversal will cost the county a large cash bond plus
numerous years of compounded interest. If the costly reversal
were to lead to public criticism of the prosecutors who handled
79. See Richard Salgado, Note, Tribunals Organized to Convict: Searching for a Lesser
Evil in the Capital Juror Death Qualification Process in United States v. Green, 2005
B.Y.U. L. REV. 519, 520-21; Rosenberg, supra note 10 (quoting prosecutor as saying that
"[e]veryone who's ever prosecuted a murder case wants a death-qualified jury").
80. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: De-
ciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV.
759, 776 (1995) ("A common route to the bench is through a prosecutor's office, where try-
ing high-profile capital cases can result in publicity and name recognition for a prosecutor
with judicial ambitions.").
81. See Liebman, supra note 19, at 2119-29.
82. See id. at 2127 ("[Elven in the rare event that there is someone back home who
can be, and who is, singled out for a reversal penalty five or ten years after the fact, the
penalty comes nowhere near canceling out the amortized rewards from generating the
mistaken death sentence in the first place."). To the contrary, prosecutors that cut corners
and commit misconduct are sometimes rewarded. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley,
Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at 1 (explaining how prosecutors re-
buked by an appellate court were promoted to supervisory positions and later elected
judges).
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the case, 3 future capital prosecutors would have a strong incen-
tive not just to win their capital cases, but also to ensure that de-
fendants have the fairest possible trial and have the benefit of all
close calls so that there will not be an appellate reversal.
The prospect of forfeiting a large bond also would motivate
county prosecutors to advocate improvement of the abysmal state
of representation provided to indigent defendants. As Stephen
Bright remarked over a decade ago, it is often the defendant with
the worst lawyer, rather than the one who committed the worst
crime, who receives the death penalty.' Yet, under the current
system, all that most prosecutors do about the inadequacy of rep-
resentation is privately lament the problem. 5 County prosecutors
have little incentive to push for better representation for defen-
dants because complaining about the lawyers a judge has ap-
pointed 6 almost certainly would hurt a prosecutor's working re-
83. Unfortunately, at present, reversals often do not lead to shaming of the trial
prosecutor because courts tend to omit prosecutors' names from their opinions, thus
shielding them from embarrassment. See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 82 ("Appellate
courts rarely name prosecutors or defense attorneys in their opinions, even when a lawyer
is found to have acted abominably."). While this practice is unlikely to change, investiga-
tive reporters would have greater incentive to dig up the prosecutors' names when coun-
ties have posted a bond because the story could focus not only on the appellate reversal
but also the large cash bond the county would forfeit.
84. See Bright, supra note 51, at 1836.
85. Consider the case of Calvin Burdine, whose capital conviction was reversed be-
cause his lawyer slept through trial. On remand, the trial judge refused to appoint Bur-
dine's very competent appellate lawyer to handle the retrial. The refusal outraged the lo-
cal newspaper and prompted a federal judge to order the state trial judge to explain her
actions. Yet, the Attorney General's Office did not oppose the judge's actions, saying,
"That's between the judge and Mr. Burdine's lawyers." Henry Weinstein, Attorney in
'Sleeping Lawyer' Case Hits Roadblock in Texas, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2002, at 28; Henry
Weinstein, U.S., State Jurists Tangle in Next Phase of Sleeping-Lawyer Saga, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 2002, at 30. For other examples, see Dirk Johnson, Shoddy Defense by Lawyers
Puts Innocents on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000, at Al (explaining that Chicago
Mayor Richard M. Daley supported a moratorium on executions because when he prose-
cuted death penalty cases as a Cook County state's attorney, "the defense lawyers in some
of those cases were incompetent"); Laura LaFay, Virginia's Poor Receive Justice on the
Cheap: Rock-Bottom Pay for Court-Appointed Lawyers Undermines System, Lawyer Says,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 15, 1998, at Al (quoting prosecutor as saying that litigating
against inexperienced and inadequate lawyers "doesn't give me any satisfaction as a
prosecutor, and I don't think it serves justice").
86. On the manners in which unqualified attorneys are appointed by judges to handle
capital cases, see Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementation of
the American Bar Association's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death
Penalty and Calling for a Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3,
14 (1996); Paul Duggan, George W. Bush: The Record in Texas; Attorneys' Ineptitude
Doesn't Halt Executions, WASH. POST, May 12, 2000, at Al.
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lationship with that judge.17 While the harm of sticking their
necks out is great, the benefit of fighting for better representation
for indigent defendants, at present, is minimal; appellate courts
infrequently reverse capital convictions based on ineffective assis-
tance of counsel,88 and even when such reversals occur, it is not
the prosecutors who are held responsible.
The prospect of forfeiting a bond could change the current state
of affairs and lead prosecutors to advocate better indigent defense
representation. If the reversal of any death sentence required the
county to forfeit the large bond it posted, and if prosecutors were
held politically responsible for the forfeiture, they would have an
incentive to ensure that defendants are adequately represented
at trial. Thus, prosecutors might not stand by quietly while local
judges appoint unqualified cronies, and they might not sit idly
while drunk or sleeping lawyers provide terrible representation to
defendants during trial.8 9 To the contrary, the elected District At-
torney (and her subordinates) might advocate for defendants to
receive qualified, conscious, and sober counsel before trials begin.
Accordingly, if an appointed lawyer's incompetence became ap-
parent during trial, prosecutors could move for a mistrial, rather
than face the prospect of a successful ineffective assistance of
counsel claim that would lead to forfeiture of the county's bond. 90
Put simply, the prospect of a cash penalty that might result in the
87. See Mary Flood, What Price Justice? Gary Graham Case Fueled Debate over Ap-
pointed Attorneys, HOUS. CHRON., July 1, 2000, at Al ("Until five years ago, often the only
requirement for an appointment to a capital murder case was a lawyer's close relation-
ship-either through friendship or campaign contributions-to the judge.").
88. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text; see also Donald A. Dripps, Ineffec-
tive Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 242, 284 (1997) (noting the difficulty of making successful ineffective assis-
tance of counsel challenges).
89. Consider the case of Joe Frank Cannon who repeatedly was appointed to handle
capital cases in Harris County, Texas, even though he had ten separate clients sentenced
to death and reportedly fell asleep during a number of their trials. See Paul M. Barrett,
On the Defense: Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About System, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at Al; see also John Makeig, Asleep on the Job? Slaying Trial Boring,
Lawyer Says, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 14, 1992, at A35 (retained lawyer in capital case con-
ceded he was sleeping because the trial was boring); Henry Weinstein, A Sleeping Lawyer
and a Ticket to Death Row, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at Al (discussing performance of
capital defense attorney in case where "prosecutors acknowledge that sleeping occurred
but say that should not bar the execution."). If Harris County had faced the possibility of
forfeiting a substantial bond for reversal of a death sentence, prosecutors likely would
have opposed the appointment of poor quality lawyers to numerous capital cases.
90. A prosecutor's mistrial motion premised on the grounds that the defendant is be-
ing treated unfairly would certainly amount to manifest necessity, and double jeopardy
would not bar reprosecution. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 610-12 (1976).
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elected District Attorney being held politically accountable if the
death sentence were reversed could lead prosecutors to be more
proactive in seeking quality representation for indigent defen-
dants.91
In adopting the all-or-nothing approach, the most difficult issue
for state legislatures to resolve would be the amount of the bond.
As noted, it would make sense for state legislatures to set the
bond at the average amount the state spends to protect a death
sentence on appeal. Some states may have this figure readily
available, but even those without the information could procure it
by retaining a statistician or economist to analyze the costs. Once
an appropriate amount for the bond is determined, legislatures
could draft a statute along the lines set forth here:
a. Preamble
1. Whereas the death penalty is a fitting and appropriate
punishment for perpetrators of heinous crimes, and
2. Whereas local prosecutors should retain discretion to de-
termine which cases merit capital prosecutions, and
3. Whereas the costs of imposing the death penalty are sub-
stantial, and
4. Whereas the state shoulders all of the appellate costs to
ensure that death sentences are in fact carried out, the fol-
lowing procedures shall be required to ensure the death
penalty will be applied in a fair, non-arbitrary manner that
will be upheld on appeal.
b. Requirement to Post a Bond: In any case in which county
prosecutors determine that the death penalty is merited, the
county must remit a bond of X dollars to the state treasury be-
fore filing capital charges. The bond will be held in an individ-
ual interest-bearing account and will accrue interest at the
prime rate as published by the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System.
91. On this point, consider recent events from Harris County, Texas, where long-time
District Attorney Chuck Rosenthal stepped back into the courtroom to personally prose-
cute a high-profile capital murder of a police officer. Perhaps because Rosenthal was per-
sonally involved and his reputation on the line, the prosecution took the unusual step of
pressing for the defendant to receive the best possible appointed lawyer. See Deborah
Wrigley, Judge Clears Courtroom to Have One-On-One Talk With Accused Cop Killer,
KTRK NEWS, Nov. 28, 2006, http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=local&id=4804766.
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c. Recovery of Bond Following Execution: If a death sentence
is imposed following trial, and if that death sentence is not
reversed or overturned on appeal or in a habeas corpus pe-
tition, the full bond amount, plus interest, shall be returned
to the county within 30 days following the execution.
d. Consequences of Failed Prosecution:
1. Failed Prosecution or Appeal: Except as provided in
sections d(2) and d(3), if the capital prosecution does not
result in an execution, the full bond plus all accrued inter-
est will be forfeited to the state.
2. Commutation: In the event that the death sentence is
commuted by the Governor for reasons other than prose-
cutorial misconduct, the full bond amount shall be re-
turned to the county, plus interest, within 30 days follow-
ing the commutation.
A. For purposes of section d(2), prosecutorial miscon-
duct shall be deemed not to have occurred unless the
Governor specifically provides in writing that prosecu-
torial misconduct was a motivating factor for the com-
mutation.
B. In the event there is any dispute between the state
and the county about whether the commutation was
due to prosecutorial misconduct, the dispute shall be
resolved by the Attorney General of the State within
30 days following the commutation.
3. Death: In the event that the death-sentenced individual
dies prior to the exhaustion of his appeals, the full bond
amount, plus interest, shall be returned to the county
within 30 days following the prisoner's death.
B. The Graduated Approach
The second proposal is what could be called a "graduated" bond
forfeiture. As with the all-or-nothing approach, counties would be
required to post a bond before seeking the death penalty. If the
county prosecutors succeeded in procuring a death sentence and
preserving the sentence through the appellate process, then the
state would return the bond amount, plus interest, to the county
following the execution. If the county failed to win a death sen-
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tence or if the sentence were reversed on appeal, then the county
would forfeit part of the bond. The amount of the forfeiture would
depend on the stage of the process where the death sentence was
lost.
For example, if the county sought the death penalty and the
jury refused to return a death sentence, the state might provide
for the return of 75% of the bond amount, plus the interest ac-
crued on that amount. Returning such a substantial amount of
the bond would reflect the fact that the case ended quickly and
the state was not forced to expend any money to defend a death
sentence on appeal. Such a large refund would signal to prosecu-
tors that they need not abandon the death penalty in all difficult
cases because, even if they are unsuccessful some of the time, the
county would not lose an overwhelming amount of money. Never-
theless, the risk of losing 25% of the bond amount should deter
prosecutors from seeking the death penalty in non-meritorious
cases.
Under a graduated approach, the percentage of the bond re-
funded to the county would diminish as the capital case pro-
gressed through the appellate process. Therefore, if a jury handed
down a death sentence, and the state were forced to defend that
sentence on appeal, the County would forfeit 50% of the bond if
the death sentence were reversed during the direct appeal proc-
ess. If the death sentence were reversed during the collateral
postconviction review process (which follows direct appeals), the
county would forfeit 75% of the bond amount. Finally, if any court
overturned the death sentence due to prosecutorial misconduct,
the county would forfeit 100% of the bond amount, regardless of
when in the process the reversal occurred. 92
As with the all-or-nothing approach, a few exceptions would be
warranted for the graduated approach. Once again, the county
would be entitled to a full refund of the bond, plus interest, if the
prisoner's death sentence were commuted for reasons other than
prosecutorial misconduct, or if the prisoner died prior to the ex-
haustion of his appeals. Additionally, the legislature might want
to add an exception allowing the county to fully recover the bond,
plus interest, if the death sentence were reversed due to a water-
92. Sadly, prosecutorial misconduct, primarily in the form of suppressing exculpatory
evidence, accounts for almost 20% of reversals at the state and federal postconviction
stage. See LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 41.
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shed change in substantive criminal doctrine.93 In this respect, if
the prosecutor made an error at trial that was simply unforesee-
able, then she should not be blamed and the full bond amount
should be refunded to the county.
Like the all-or-nothing approach, the graduated forfeiture
would provide counties with an incentive to pursue only the
strongest capital cases. If a case looks like a long-shot, the gradu-
ated approach would encourage prosecutors not to seek the death
penalty at the outset, or at least to plea bargain before trial be-
gins.
The graduated approach also would encourage prosecutors to
consider bargaining with the defendant during the appellate or
habeas corpus process-a practice that is largely unheard of to-
day.94 For instance, if the county prevails in the first series of ap-
peals but comes to see its position as weak and fears that the
death sentence will not be preserved all the way through the
lengthy appellate process, the county might reach a compromise
with the defendant whereby a life sentence is imposed. Thus, the
state is spared the unnecessary expense of further appeals and
the county is allowed to recover a portion of its bond amount.
Finally, a graduated bond forfeiture approach might encourage
the revival of the now rare use of executive clemency. Under the
current system, governors and pardon boards are reluctant to
take responsibility for granting clemency because it is politically
unpopular to stop an execution.9" And if governors do commute a
death sentence, they typically do so after millions of dollars have
been expended on the lengthy appeals process. 96 Under the
93. This would be a twist on the Supreme Court's retroactivity doctrine under Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which ordinarily forbids petitioners from benefiting from new
rules of procedure, but makes an exception for "watershed rules of criminal procedure." Id.
at 311. Of course, just as it is nearly impossible for a habeas petitioner to prevail under
the Teague doctrine, it likewise would be very difficult for a county to prevail either. On
the significance and impossibility of surmounting the Teague doctrine, see Stephen F.
Smith, Activism As Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1057,
1074-77 (2002).
94. See Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2006) (advocating
that prosecutors and defendants settle cases that are pending on habeas corpus petitions).
95. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital Clemency, 17
J.L. & POL. 669, 671-72 (2001).
96. Capital prisoners rarely receive clemency before their appeals have been ex-
hausted (or nearly exhausted), although it does happen occasionally when governors make
blanket commutations at the end of their terms. See Daniel T. Kobil, Do the Paperwork or
Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 656-59 (1991) (discussing clemencies
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graduated bond forfeiture approach (as well as the all-or-nothing
approach), county governments would have an incentive in
weaker cases to lobby the governor to commute death sentences
that could possibly be reversed on appeal. In other words, because
counties would receive a refund of the entire bond amount, plus
interest, if the governor commutes a death sentence, they would
have a financial incentive to lobby for commutations if they
feared that the death sentence might be reversed on appeal. If
counties successfully lobbied to commute death sentences that
had a fair chance of being reversed on appeal, the result would be
a system where less time and money is devoted to capital appeals
because the commutation would eliminate the need for further
litigation.
Taking all of these considerations into account, a state legisla-
ture interested in the graduated approach could enact legislation
modeled on the following draft statute:
a. Preamble
1. Whereas the death penalty is a fitting and appropriate
punishment for perpetrators of heinous crimes, and
2. Whereas local prosecutors should retain discretion to de-
termine which cases merit capital prosecutions, and
3. Whereas the costs of imposing the death penalty are sub-
stantial, and
4. Whereas the state shoulders all of the appellate costs to
ensure that death sentences are in fact carried out, the fol-
lowing procedures shall be required to ensure the death
penalty will be applied in a fair, non-arbitrary manner that
will be upheld on appeal.
b. Requirement to Post a Bond: In any case in which county
prosecutors determine that the death penalty is merited, the
county must remit a bond of X dollars to the State treasury be-
fore filing capital charges. The bond will be held in an individ-
ual interest-bearing account and will accrue interest at the
prime rate as published by the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System.
awarded by Ohio Governor Richard Celeste at the end of his second term); SARAT, supra
note 71, at 1-32 (discussing Governor George Ryan's commutations in Illinois).
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c. Recovery of Bond Following Execution: If a death sentence
is imposed following trial, and if that death sentence is not re-
versed or overturned on appeal or in a habeas corpus petition,
the full bond amount, plus interest, shall be returned to the
county within 30 days following the execution.
d. Consequences of Failed Prosecution: In the event that a
capital prosecution does not result in execution, the bond
posted by the county shall be returned to the county in the pro-
portions set forth as follows:
1. Prior to Jury Selection: In the event that a county has
already posted a bond but states in writing, prior to the
beginning of jury selection, that it no longer intends to
seek the death penalty, the full bond amount, plus inter-
est, shall be returned to the county within 30 days of the
county's written notification.
2. Mistrial: In the event that the trial ends in a mistrial
for reasons other than prosecutorial misconduct as speci-
fied in section d(6)(A), the full bond amount, plus interest,
shall be returned to the county within 30 days of the mis-
trial.
3. Acquittal or Life Sentence: In the event that the trial
ends in an acquittal or the imposition of a sentence other
than death, 75% of the bond amount, plus interest on that
portion only, shall be returned to the county within 30
days of the verdict.
4. Reversed on Direct Appeal: Except as provided in sec-
tion d(6), if a death sentence is imposed following trial but
the death sentence is reversed during the direct appeal
process to the state's intermediate court of appeals, the
state supreme court or the Supreme Court of the United
States, 50% of the bond amount, plus interest on that por-
tion only, shall be returned to the county within 30 days of
the termination of the direct appeal process.
5. Reversed on Collateral Appeal: Except as provided in
section d(6), if a death sentence is imposed following trial,
but the death sentence is reversed during the collateral
appeals process, which shall include state and federal ha-
beas corpus actions, 25% of the bond amount, plus interest
on that portion only, shall be returned to the county
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within 30 days of the termination of the collateral appeal
process.
6. Prosecutorial Misconduct: In the event of a mistrial or
the reversal of a death sentence due to a specific finding of
prosecutorial misconduct as specified in section d(6)(A),
the county shall forfeit the full bond amount, plus all ac-
crued interest.
A. Prosecutorial misconduct shall include the failure to
turn over exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the unlawful exercise of
peremptory challenges based on race or gender, sub-
orning perjury, knowingly using false testimony, coerc-
ing witnesses, or fabricating evidence.
B. In the event there is any dispute between the
county and the state as to whether the reversal of a
death sentence was due to prosecutorial misconduct,
the dispute shall be resolved by the Attorney General
of the State within 30 days following the termination of
the appeals process.
7. Commutation: In the event that the death sentence is
commuted by the Governor for reasons other than prose-
cutorial misconduct as specified in section d(7)(A), the full
bond amount shall be returned to the county, with inter-
est, within 30 days following the commutation.
A. For purposes of section d(7) only, prosecutorial mis-
conduct shall be presumed not to have occurred unless
the Governor specifically states in writing that prose-
cutorial misconduct was a motivating factor for the
commutation.
B. In the event there is any ambiguity about whether
the commutation was due to prosecutorial misconduct,
the dispute shall be resolved by the Attorney General
of the State within 30 days following the commutation.
8. Death: In the event that the death-sentenced individual
dies prior to the exhaustion of his appeals, the full bond
amount, plus interest, shall be returned to the county
within 30 days following the prisoner's death.
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C. Solving the Small County Problem
The purpose of forcing county prosecutors to post a bond prior
to seeking the death penalty is to change the behavior of medium-
and large-sized counties that overproduce death sentences. The
goal is to make them face the full financial consequences of their
decisions and to deter them from seeking the death penalty in
marginal cases. The proposal is not intended to deter the use of
capital punishment in appropriate cases. Yet, critics could argue
that the proposal would place an impossible financial burden on
small counties, thus making the death penalty so expensive that
only wealthy counties could utilize it.97 While I share this con-
cern, I offer two reasons why it is not particularly worrisome.
First, it is already rare for small counties to seek the death
penalty because they are unwilling to shoulder the tremendous
pretrial and trial costs of capital cases.9" And when truly egre-
gious cases do come along, small counties are sometimes willing
to seek the death penalty, even knowing full well that it will
cause serious financial problems for the county. 99 For example,
consider the vicious murder of James Byrd, who was dragged to
his death in Jasper County, Texas. 00 Although prosecutors knew
97. See Steve Brewer, A Deadly Distinction; County has Budget to Prosecute with a
Vengeance; District Attorney's Office Focuses on Capital Cases, and Commissioners Court
Backs up the Approach, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 4, 2001, at A28 ("'One of the reasons Harris
County tries so many capital murder cases is simple economics-we can afford to,' said
state District Judge Michael McSpadden.").
98. See, e.g., WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE DEATH PENALTY
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC DEFENSE 33 (2006), available at, http://
www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/finalreport.pdf ("Several smaller [Washington] counties
face difficult financial circumstances and prosecutors in those counties may be concerned
by the significant impacts the costs of a death penalty case would have on the county's fi-
nancial condition."); Robert Bryce, Trial's High Costs Tax Jasper Coffers, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 25, 1999, at 2 ("[1In recent years, several [small] Texas counties have not
pursued the death penalty because of the high costs involved."); Tolson, supra note 7
(showing that between 1976 and 2000, 138 of Texas's 254 counties never sought the death
penalty and that another 53 counties sought death only once during that period).
99. Dartmouth economist Katherine Baicker has determined that counties that seek
the death penalty have a higher tax rate than counties that do not utilize the death pen-
alty. See Katherine Baicker, The Budgetary Repercussions of Capital Convictions 15 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8382, 2001), available at, http://www.
nber.org/papers/w8382.
100. For accounts of the Byrd case, see JOYCE KING, HATE CRIME: THE STORY OF A
DRAGGING IN JASPER, TEXAS (2002); DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, A DEATH IN TEXAS: A STORY OF
RACE, MURDER AND A SMALL TOWN'S STRUGGLE FOR REDEMPTION (2003). In the twenty-
five years before the Byrd case, Jasper County sent only one defendant to death row. See
Tolson & Brewer, supra note 9.
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that seeking the death penalty would be a financial crunch for the
small county of about 35,000 people, 10' they charged three defen-
dants with capital murder and spent more than $1 million seek-
ing the death penalty. 102 Indeed, the county actually raised prop-
erty taxes to pay for the trial.1"3 If prosecutors felt so strongly
that the death penalty outweighed the huge financial costs, it is
unlikely that they would have been deterred by the additional
costs of posting a bond. 0
4
Second, when a truly heinous case arises, counties that are fi-
nancially unable to post a bond to seek the death penalty could
apply to the state government for supplemental funding. On occa-
sion, state governments provide counties with discretionary funds
to assist with the unusually high costs of certain criminal
cases.' 5 Consider the example of another small Texas jurisdic-
tion, Polk County, which has a population of 46,000.16 Polk
County has been trying for decades to execute John Paul Penry
for a brutal rape and murder. 0 7 Due to Supreme Court rulings,
Penry has been granted two retrials, which have cost Polk County
exorbitant sums of money. To help defray the costs of the third
trial, the State of Texas provided Polk County with $100,000. 10'
101. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS, http://quickfacts.cen
sus.gov/qfd/states/48/48241.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
102. See Gold, supra note 16.
103. See id. (explaining that the Byrd case forced "a 6.7% increase in [local] property
taxes over two years to pay for the trial").
104. See Richard Stewart, Three Indicted by Grand Jury in Jasper Case; Charges of
Capital Murder Face Whites in Black's Dragging Death, HOUS. CHRON., July 7, 1998, at Al
(quoting Jasper County District Attorney as saying that the trial costs could be $1 million
and that "'Obviously, there will have to be an increase in taxes .... We'll do what we have
to do.'"). There are similar situations in other small counties. See, e.g., Barbara A. Serrano,
A Cop-Killing Trial-At All Costs-Million-Dollar Prosecution Could Bring Okanogan
County to its Knees Financially, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 31, 1999, at Al (explaining that
Okanogan County, Washington sought the death penalty for a cop-killer even though the
costs required a freeze on hiring, raises, and procurement, because, according to the chair-
man of the County Board of Commissioners,"[w]e have to put every bit we can into this
trial.").
105. Serrano, supra note 104 (stating that as of 1999, "[t]wenty-nine states have cre-
ated special accounts or teams of public defenders to assist counties in trying capital cases
against indigents").
106. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS, http://quickfacts.cen
sus.gov/qfd/states/48/48373.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
107. For background on the crime, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 307-13 (1989).
108. See Gold, supra note 16; cf. WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, supra note 98, at 33 (describ-
ing the Extraordinary Criminal Justice Costs Act of 1999, which allows Washington coun-
ties to apply for reimbursement of certain costs in first-degree murder cases).
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If states are occasionally willing to assist small counties with
the hefty trial costs of capital cases, they also likely would help
small counties to post bonds in unusually egregious cases. Of
course, this scenario carries the risk of the exception swallowing
the rule. The purpose of requiring counties to post (and possibly
forfeit) a cash bond to seek the death penalty is to force them to
internalize the steep financial costs of unsuccessful death penalty
appeals. If counties are regularly permitted to use state money to
post the bonds, then they will not internalize those costs and will
be unlikely to change their behavior.
While this scenario is problematic, it would be unlikely to occur
very often. States have only a relatively small amount of discre-
tionary money to assist counties with capital cases. 109 And while
state legislatures might be convinced to assist a small (or even a
large) county with the costs of posting a bond in a James Byrd-
type case, legislatures likely would be unwilling to provide ex
ante funding for multiple such cases in a given year.
III. INCENTIVES FOR STATE LEGISLATURES
The final significant question to address is whether state legis-
latures would have any interest in requiring counties to post and
risk forfeiting a bond to seek the death penalty. There are two
reasons why the answer might be yes. First, the available data
indicates that states spend large sums of money to defend coun-
ties' death penalty verdicts on appeal. In recent years, there are
increasing examples of states bucking the "tough on crime" trend
to reduce corrections spending in favor of funding other budget
priorities. Second, legislators from smaller counties that rarely
use the death penalty have an added incentive to require a bond
in capital cases because they are currently spending their tax dol-
lars to subsidize the capital appeals of larger counties.
109. See, e.g., WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, supra note 98, at 33 (explaining that Washing-
ton State's Extraordinary Criminal Justice Costs Act of 1999, which provides state fund-
ing to counties, "has not been fully funded and its funding has steadily declined").
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A. Appeals Are the Most Expensive Aspect of Capital Cases
A number of studies have found capital punishment to be a
more expensive process than life imprisonment. For instance, a
North Carolina study estimated the costs of an execution to be
$2.16 million more than the cost of imprisoning an individual for
life. "° A Texas study conducted in the early 1990s estimated that
the death penalty cost $2.3 million per case prosecuted in the
state, about three times the cost of imprisoning someone for forty
years. 1 ' Commentators have estimated that large states such as
California and Florida could save tens of millions of dollars per
year by eliminating capital punishment. 1 2
Significantly, the bulk of the costs associated with capital cases
are not the trials themselves, but the appeals."' Because of com-
plicated rules and multiple stages of review in capital cases, ap-
pellate costs are far greater than costs in non-capital cases."' For
instance, a 2003 study of Kansas found that the appellate costs
associated with death penalty cases were more than twenty times
the costs in non-capital cases." 5 A North Carolina study found
the appellate and postconviction costs in capital cases to be about
110. See PHILIP J. COOK ET AL., THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH
CAROLINA 78 (1993), available at http://www-pps.aas.duke.edu/people/faculty/cook/comnc.
pdf.
111. See Christy Hoppe, Executions Cost Texas Millions: Study Finds It's Cheaper to
Jail Killers for Life, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1992, at 1A.
112. See e.g., S.V. Date, The High Price of Killing Killers: Death Penalty Prosecutions
Cost Taxpayers Millions Annually, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 4, 2000, at 1A (explaining that
Florida spends $51 million per year to enforce the death penalty); Rone Tempest, Death
Row Often Means a Long Life: California Condemns Many Murderers, but Few Are Ever
Executed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at 1 ("[Mlaintaining the California death penalty sys-
tem costs taxpayers more than $114 million a year beyond the cost of simply keeping the
convicts locked up for life and not counting the millions more in court costs needed to
prosecute capital cases and hold post-conviction hearings in state and federal courts.").
113. See Bohm, supra note 16, at 582 ("The posttrial stage generally is the most expen-
sive part of the entire process."); Liebman, supra note 19, at 2139 (describing as "silly"
that we "pay a few thousands dollars per capital trial, then millions of dollars per post-
trial review"); Death Penalty Cases Costly, Legislators Told, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 30,
1995, at B3 (reporting Pennsylvania Attorney General's assertion that "the cost of defend-
ing death penalty appeals [in the state] could reach $1 million per case").
114. See COOK ET AL., supra note 110, at 64 ("[W]e estimate that death cases are 45
percent more costly on direct appeal than life cases, on average.").
115. See LEGISLATIVE POST AUDIT COMM., LEGISLATURE OF KAN., COSTS INCURRED FOR
DEATH PENALTY CASES: A K-GOAL AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ii (2003)
[hereinafter KAN. DEATH PENALTY COSTS], available at http'//www.klegislature.org/post
audit/audits-performl04pa03a.pdf ("At just over $400,000, the projected appeal-related
costs for the death penalty cases in our sample was more than 20 times the projected cost
for cases in which the death penalty wasn't sought.").
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four times as great as trial costs.'16 A capital defense lawyer in
California explained over a decade ago that each death penalty
case costs between $3.5 and $4.5 million in postconviction costs,
far in excess of the $1 to $1.2 million in trial costs." 7
More interesting than the sheer size of appellate and postcon-
viction costs is who pays for them. Typically, it is states that
spend millions of dollars to defend counties' death penalty ver-
dicts following trial."' In most instances, it is the state attorney
general's office, rather than county prosecutors, which handle ap-
peals and habeas corpus petitions in capital cases." 9 In addition,
many states provide lawyers for indigent defendants on appeal
and state postconviction review, something that is not provided in
non-capital cases. 20 In addition to attorney time, the state typi-
cally pays for court costs associated with death penalty cases.' 2 ' A
recent study of fourteen Kansas death-penalty cases found that
the state paid more than $3 million in appellate related costs,
compared with less than $100,000 paid by the counties.'22
State legislators may soon grow weary of paying high appellate
costs for death penalty verdicts that often are reversed on appeal.
And legislators also might wish to shift those costs to county
budgets. Consider the slowly emerging trend in non-capital ex-
penditures. During the 1990s, state spending on corrections dou-
bled from $17 billion to $35 billion.'23 But as prison costs have
116. See COOKETAL., supra note 110, at 77.
117. See Charles L. Linder, Opinion, Cost of Death: A Billion Dollars and Counting,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, at M1.
118. See, e.g., CONN. COMM'N ON THE DEATH PENALTY, STUDY PURSUANT TO PUBLIC ACT
No. 01-151 OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CONNECTICUT 67 (2003) (ex-
plaining that the Office of the Chief State's Attorney "has requested state funding to add
six prosecutors and support staff to prosecute habeas corpus proceedings in death penalty
cases"), available at http://www.opm.state.ct.us/pdpdl/CDPfDCPFinal Report-Jan2003.
doc.
119. See supra note 18.
120. For example, Tennessee's Office of the Post-Conviction Defender has a staff of
thirteen and a budget of more than $1 million per year. See WILSON ET AL., supra note 75,
at 25-26.
121. In New Jersey, for instance, "two additional clerks have been needed almost full
time to assist the [state supreme court] justices with research on the capital cases." MARY
E. FORSBERG, N.J. POLICY PERSPECTIVE, MONEY FOR NOTHING?: THE FINANCIAL COST OF
NEW JERSEY'S DEATH PENALTY 10 (2005), available at http://www.njpp.org/rpt-moneyfor
nothing.html.
122. See KAN. DEATH PENALTY COSTS, supra note 115, at 12. The Kansas study found
that the state had paid 85% of the total death penalty costs, compared with only 15% paid
by the counties. See id.
123. See ROBIN CAMPBELL, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, DOLLARS AND SENTENCES:
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skyrocketed, some legislators have begun to express concerns
about having enough funding for other public needs, such as
health care, education, and law enforcement. 124 Although it is still
popular to be "tough on crime," some states recently have taken
steps toward reducing their corrections costs.125 In 2003, five
states reduced sentences for nonviolent offenders, and a handful
of other states created substance abuse treatment programs as an
alternative to incarceration. 2 6 Recent reports by the Vera Insti-
tute of Justice have documented that twenty-five states reduced
their corrections budgets in 2002,127 while "at least nine states
decreased their actual corrections expenditures in fiscal year
2003, and at least 14 [states] cut their initial corrections appro-
priations in fiscal year 2004."12" Whereas a decade ago it might
LEGISLATORS' VIEWS ON PRISONS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE BUDGET CRISIS 3 (2003).
124. See, e.g., Ann Imse, Prison Trend Costly; Inmates Enter State's Cellblocks at Rate
Well Above Average, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), June 19, 2006, at 4A (discussing a
Colorado legislator's complaint that the need to come up with an extra 7,000 prison beds
would cost a half-billion dollars and would "eat up our entire budget" and stating that
"[t]he bill for prisons plays a major role in tight funding for other needs such as education
and health care"); Bill Murphy, Not All Agree New Jails Needed; Lawmaker Says County
Should Let Some Offenders Out on Bail to Free Up Existing Cells, HOUS. CHRON. Dec. 11,
2006, at Al (quoting state legislator advocating shorter sentences or granting bail more
often to avoid spending $267 million to build new jails); Joseph Turner, Huge Prison Bill
on its Way, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Oct. 8, 2006, at Al ("Lawmakers tried for several
years to avoid building a full-fledged prison in Eastern Washington because of its cost-
$231 million."); cf. MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: HOW TO REDUCE CRIME AND
END MASS INCARCERATION 12 (2005) ("Even with a slowly recovering national economy,
states simply do not (and will not) have the revenue to continue prison expansion while
simultaneously supporting Medicaid, maintaining low tax rates, and adequately funding
education and health systems."); Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sen-
tencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1309 (2005) ("If the citizens in one state would rather
spend a greater proportion of their limited budget on education than the construction of
new prisons, they could adjust state sentencing policy accordingly.").
125. See JACOBSON, supra note 124, at 85 (discussing how twenty-five states reduced
their corrections budgets in 2002 because of budget shortfalls); RYAN S. KING & MARC
MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN AN ERA OF
FISCAL RESTRAINT 11-16 (2002), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/
Documents/publications/inc statesentencingpolicy.pdf; Rachel E. Barkow, Administering
Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 807 (2005).
126. See JON WOOL & DON STEMEN, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CHANGING FORTUNES
OR CHANGING ATTITUDES?: SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS REFORMS IN 2003 6-7 (2004),
available at http://www.vera.org/publication-pdf/226 431.pdf.
127. DANIEL F. WILHELM & NICHOLAS R. TURNER, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, IS THE
BUDGET CRISIS CHANGING THE WAY WE LOOK AT SENTENCING AND INCARCERATION? 2
(2002), available at http://www.vera.orgpublication-pdf/167-263.pdf.
128. WOOL & STEMEN, supra note 126, at 2.
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have been impossible to cut corrections budgets, today it is fre-
quently considered. 129 As Professor Rachel Barkow has explained:
Examples abound of legislators emphasizing fiscal concerns in their
newfound support for reduced sentencing. A Michigan legislator
noted that when he first introduced bills to reduce mandatory mini-
mum sentences, he received little support. After a conference on the
state budget, however, the governor called him "to see how we can
make these bills happen." Kansas's decision to require treatment in-
stead of incarceration for first-time, nonviolent drug offenders rested
in part on the fact that "those people who favor being tough on crime
don't want to find the money to build more prisons." Washington
passed its drug treatment diversion programs, according to one ex-
pert, because "[tihe fiscal crisis has brought together the folks who
think sentences are too long with the folks who are perfectly happy
with the sentences but think prison is costing too much." One Texas
state representative supported treatment options for drug offenders
because it was cost effective and would free prison space for more
violent offenders. Several governors have ordered the early release of
prisoners with the explicit goal of reducing correctional costs and
addressing budget crises. 130
Although most of the movement to restore fiscal discipline has
focused on reducing incarceration costs, the same logic should ap-
ply with even greater force to the use of the death penalty, par-
ticularly since there has been a small decline in the popularity of
the death penalty 13' and a substantial decline in the number of
death sentences in recent years. 132 Because capital cases are so
expensive, and because so few of them actually end in executions,
the system is ripe for reforms that impose greater fiscal disci-
pline. 133 Money saved on exorbitant capital appeals is money the
states could spend on other projects. 134
129. See CAMPBELL, supra note 123, at 4 (citing a Texas legislator's explanation in
early 2003 that a budget deficit required the state to find $172 million in corrections sav-
ings); Chris Suellentrop, The Right Has a Jailhouse Conversion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 47 (discussing support for the Second Chance Act, which proposed
nearly $100 million in spending to assist states in returning prisoners to society).
130. Barkow, supra note 124, at 1287-88.
131. See Robert M. Bohm, American Death Penalty Opinion: Past, Present, and Future,
in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 27 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2003) (explaining that death penalty support, while still strong at 70%, is down from
the 80% that favored the punishment in the mid-1990s).
132. See Neil A. Lewis, Death Sentences Decline, and Experts Offer Reasons, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at A28.
133. Consider the California experience, where many prisoners sit on death row but
only a handful have been executed. Experts estimate that California could save tens of
millions of dollars each year by choosing its death penalty cases more sparingly. See Tem-
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B. Why Small Counties Have an Added Incentive to Back the
Bond Proposal
As explained above, the most expensive part of the death-
penalty system-appellate and postconviction costs-is typically
funded at the state level. Thus, as Professor James Liebman has
cogently explained, "nearly the entire cost of the review process
and its outcome is borne, not by the trial-level actors who com-
mitted the errors in the first place, but by taxpayers spread
throughout the entire state (who fund the state court system and
state attorney general's office)."135 Financially, it is not a good
deal for small counties that rarely seek the death penalty to sub-
sidize the significant appellate costs of larger counties that make
frequent use of capital punishment. Thus, counties that use the
death penalty infrequently have an added incentive to support a
proposal that requires active death penalty counties-which typi-
cally have greater resources-to post a bond and to pay for their
own mistakes in unsuccessful capital cases.
Take Texas, the nation's leader in executions, as an example.
In all likelihood, many of the legislators representing Harris
County, which has sent nearly 300 individuals to death row over
the last three decades, 136 would oppose any statute that required
counties to post (and possibly forfeit) a bond to seek the death
penalty. Presumably legislators in Bexar, Dallas, and Tarrant
counties, which are collectively responsible for nearly 200 addi-
tional Texas death sentences, 137 also would oppose the bond stat-
ute. But what about the 138 Texas counties that did not hand
down any death sentences between 1976 and 2000? 131 Or what
about the fifty-three counties that imposed only a single death
pest, supra note 112.
134. See Costs of the Death Penalty and Related Issues: Hearing Before the N.Y. State
Assemb. Standing Comm. on Codes, Judiciary, and Correction 3 (2005) (statement of Rich-
ard C. Dieter), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/NY-RCD-Test.pdf (explaining
that tight budgets are leading to early release of prisoners and library closings to save
costs); Fox Butterfield, As Cities Struggle, Police Get By With Less, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
2004, at A10 (stating that cities have had to reduce their police forces because of reduc-
tions in state and federal aid).
135. LIEBMAN ETAL., supra note 13, at 380.
136. See Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Total Number of Offenders Sentenced
to Death From Each County [hereinafter TDCJI, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/county
sentenced.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
137. See id.
138. See Tolson, supra note 7.
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sentence during that same period? 139 What fiscal incentive do
those nearly 200 counties have to pay for the appellate costs cre-
ated by a handful of larger (and wealthier) counties that fre-
quently use the death penalty?
Indeed, a head count of Texas counties finds that only seven of
Texas's 254 counties sent more than twenty defendants to death
row over the last thirty years. 40 The remaining 247 counties pro-
cured death sentences, on average, well less than once per year.
To be sure, the seven Texas counties"' that frequently use the
death penalty are large jurisdictions and hold a substantial num-
ber of seats in the state legislature. But even if we were to count
every Texas legislator who represents any portion of those seven
counties, they would still account for only sixty-seven of the 150
seats in the Texas House of Representatives.4 2 Moreover, many
of those sixty-seven legislative districts are in predominantly mi-
nority sections of large cities-constituencies that tend to oppose
the use of the death penalty. 143
While the political calculus is surely more complicated than
simply conducting a head-count, the reality is that well over half
the legislative districts in Texas have a fiscal incentive to require
counties to post a bond and pay for the costs of failed capital
prosecutions. The same logic likely applies in many other states
where only a handful of counties actively use the death penalty.
IV. CONCLUSION
At present, county prosecutors are free to seek the death pen-
alty as they see fit, but they typically do not have to fund the very
expensive appellate and postconviction stages of capital cases.
Accordingly, when death sentences are reversed-and many of
them are reversed for prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assis-
139. See id.
140. See TDCJ, supra note 136.
141. The seven Texas counties that have sent more than twenty individuals to death
row during the last three decades are, as of November 2006, Bexar (73), Dallas (47), Har-
ris (282), Jefferson (23), Nueces (22), Smith (21), and Tarrant (64). See id.
142. See Texas House of Representatives, House Membership, Listed By Name,
http://www.house.state.tx.us/members/welcome.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
143. Support for the death penalty is consistently 20 points lower among minorities
than Caucasians. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 2003, at 144 tbl.2.50 (2005).
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tance of counsel, and other reasons-county prosecutors are not
forced to fully internalize the costs of their failed prosecutions.
State legislatures can provide a better incentive structure for lo-
cal prosecutors by requiring counties to post a bond before seek-
ing the death penalty. Faced with the prospect of losing the bond
if the defendant is not sentenced to death or if the death sentence
is reversed on appeal, prosecutors would have an incentive to
choose their capital cases carefully and to avoid any type of mis-
conduct that might lead to reversal on appeal. Additionally, the
prospect of forfeiting a bond likely would create secondary bene-
fits, such as encouraging prosecutors to protest the appointment
of unqualified defense lawyers who might give rise to colorable
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. As a financial matter, the
bond proposal should be appealing to state legislators because it
would shift the costs of failed capital prosecutions away from
state budgets and into the hands of the county actors who insti-
gated the failed prosecutions. In addition, the bond proposal
should be particularly appealing to legislators from small coun-
ties because it re-directs some of the high appellate and postcon-
viction costs away from small counties that never use the death
penalty to large jurisdictions that frequently seek capital pun-
ishment.
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